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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court of the State of
Utah is conferred pursuant to Article VIII, Section 3, of the
Utah Constitution, Rule 3 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme
Court, and § 78-2-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended.
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NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN TRIAL COURT
This is a civil

action which involves an action

upon a promissory note, commenced by Leach against Daines,
Knight

and others

(case number C-86-7249).

The case was

consolidated with an action filed by Knight against Daines
and others (case number C-87-7445).
The

factual

issues presented

in both cases were

tried before a jury.
Respondent
24(i),

R. Utah

Welden

L.

Daines, pursuant

S. Ct., adopts by reference

to

Rule

the brief of

respondent Bud Leach for purposes of this appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
In addition to the issues presented by Leach in his
brief, the following issues are presented for review to this
Court, as they relate to respondent Daines.
1.

Did Knight present to the trial Court a prima

facie case of professional negligence against Daines.
2.

Should Daines be entitled to judgment against

Knight for the amount of the judgment which Leach obtained
against Daines.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
DISPOSITION OF TRIAL COURT
Leach

commenced

this

action

(C-86-7249)

against

Daines, Knight, Player and Willyard seeking to recover the
amount

due him

on

a promissory

2

note

executed

by Daines,

Player and Willyard, dated June 10, 1980.

Recovery was

sought against Daines, Player and Willyard on the basis that
they were the makers of the note; recovery was sought against
Knight on the basis that he had expressly assumed liability
for the payment of the note by virtue of certain agreements
dated November 15, 1983.

Daines filed a cross claim against

Knight seeking judgment against Knight for any amount for
which he might be liable to Leach.
Knight filed a separate action (C-87-7445) against
Daines, Willyard, Player and Leach, seeking rescission of the
agreements, on the basis that Knight was defrauded by Daines
in entering into the agreements.
Knight's defenses to the cross-claim by Daines in
action C-86-7249 and the basis for his claims of action C-877445 were based upon the theories of a) fraud by Daines
against Knight; and b) breach of Daines1 fiduciary duty to
Knight because Daines was (i) Knight's partner, and (ii)
Daines preparation of the 1983 partnership tax returns did
not report a termination of the partnerships for purposes of
the IRS Code.
The two cases were consolidated and the matter was
tried to a jury, the jury answering special interrogatories
in which the jury determined that Daines did not defraud
Knight in executing the agreements of November 15, 1983.
The trial Court also entered a directed verdict
against Knight and in favor of Daines on the issue of the
3

breach of Daines' fiduciary duty to Knight.
Judgment was entered in favor of Leach and against
Knight,

Daines, Player

and Willyard.

Judgment

was

also

entered in favor of Daines and against Knight in the same
amount as the judgment of Leach against Daines; the judgment
was entered on October 11, 1988.

It is from this judgment

that Knight appeals.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On

June

10, 1980, Daines, Willyard

and

signed the Leach Note in the amount of $ 274,222.50.

Player
Leach

had previously had discussions with Daines about becoming a
partner with Daines, Willyard and Player in the Rock Springs
Hilton

Hotel

being

constructed

in Rock

Springs, Wyoming.

Leach advanced money with respect to the development of the
hotel.

When he did not become a partner, his advances got

converted to the Leach Note.

(Index p. 615, Tr. Vol. 1, pp.

31-35; 44-47).
The Leach Note was payable in monthly payments of $
5,000.00.

The payments were made on a timely basis for over

three years.
November

(Index p. 615, Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 28-29; 48).

15, 1983, Knight entered

into certain

On

agreements

with Willyard, Player and Daines, pursuant to which Knight
took over management of the hotel and expressly agreed to
assume and pay the obligation owing to Leach on the Leach
Note.

(Index p. 615, Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 48-51, Addendum, Ex.

"A").
4

Only one $ 5,000.00 payment was made on the Leach
Note after Knight assumed the obligation to pay it.
p. 617, Tr. Vol. 3, p. 74).

(Index

Thereafter, during early and

mid-1984, Knight informed Leach's counsel that the hotel was
having trouble and he was unable to make the $ 5,000.00
payments, but that he would make monthly interest only
payments while he was trying to turn the hotel around.
(Index p. 617, Tr. Vol. 3, p. 75). Knight did, in fact, make
monthly interest only payments of approximately $ 1,638.00
per month covering a period of approximately two years.
Knight made no claim during this period of time that he had
been defrauded or wasn't liable on the Leach Note.

In fact,

during late 1984, Knight tried to persuade Leach to take an
interest in the hotel in lieu of the amount owing on the
Leach Note and represented to Leach the hotel was making
thousands of dollars each month.
doing well.

In fact, the hotel was not

Knight eventually stopped making payments in

early 1986, solely because the hotel didn't have the money,
and this lawsuit was filed.

(Index p. 617, Tr. Vol. 3, pp.

81-83; 86-91).
Some months after the lawsuit was filed, Knight
contended for the first time that he was not liable to pay
the Leach Note because he had been defrauded by Daines into
assuming liability by misrepresentations by Daines concerning
the financial condition of the Rock Springs Hotel.
617, Tr. Vol. 3, pp. 81-83).
5

(Index p.

Knight for the first time in his answer to crossclaim by Daines (Index pp. 175-206) asserted that Daines
breached his fiduciary duty to Knight.

Subsequently and in

the various amended pleadings filed by Knight in case number
C-86-7249, and in case number C-87-7445

(Index pp. 2-28)

Knight re-asserted his claims for Breach of Fiduciary Duty
(Second claim, Index pp. 10-11), and Breach of Fiduciary Duty
- Tax Liability, etc. (Index pp. 11-16, Third Claim).

The

gravamen of Knight's claim against Daines on the theory of
breach of fiduciary duty re: termination for purposes of the
IRS Code, is, that Daines had "... failed to properly report
the termination of the partnerships for tax purposes ..."
(Index p. 15 - paragraph 35) upon the partnership tax returns
for the year 1983.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
There is no legal basis upon which this Court
should reverse the judgment of the trial Court.
1.

The trial

Court was correct

in entering

directed verdict against Knight and in favor of Daines on the
issue of the alleged breach of fiduciary duty by Daines in
not reporting

-for tax purposes- the termination of the

partnerships.

The interpretation of § 708 of the IRS Code by

Daines

relating

to

the

exception

of

the

termination

provision, was proper and in accordance with the standard of
care used by other skilled professionals.
2.

The judgment of the trial Court in awarding a
6

contemporaneous judgment in favor of Daines and against
Knight, in the same amount as the judgment recovered by Leach
against Daines was proper;

there is no legal basis upon

which that portion of the Judgment of the trial Court should
be reversed.
3.

Knight's appeal to this Court is frivolous;

this Court should affirm the trial Court and award Daines his
costs and attorney's fees incurred in connection with this
appeal.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT
IN GRANTING DIRECTED VERDICT IN
FAVOR OF DAINES ON THE ISSUE OF
DAINESf MALPRACTICE SHOULD BE
AFFIRMED.
Knight's

attack

on

the

trial

Court's

order

directing verdict in favor of Daines on the issue of the
preparation of the partnership's tax returns is couched in
terms of a violation of a breach of a fiduciary duty owed to
Knight by Daines because Daines was an accountant - CPA, and
the preparer of the partnership's tax returns for the year
1983; and further, upon the basis that Daines had a fiduciary
duty to Knight because they were partners.
1.

Daines did not commit
malpractice in the preparation
of the tax returns, and thus he
did not breach his "fiduciary"
duty to Knight.
The factual elements underlying Knight's pleaded
7

theory

of

liability

(Third

Claim

of

Relief,

Amended

Complaint, case no. C-87-7445, Index p. 54-59) are based upon
Knight's

theory

malpractice.

of

liability

in terms of professional

Knight is alleging that he has suffered losses

because the partnership was not terminated in accordance with
section 708 of the Internal Revenue Code; that Daines'
failure to prepare the partnership tax returns showing a
termination, was negligence.
The

law has recognized

that accountants

as a

skilled professional class is subject generally to the same
rules of liability for negligence in the practice in their
profession as are members of other skilled professions.,
(Smith v. London Assurance Corp., 109 A. D. 882, 96 N. Y. S.
820 (1905)).
A well known excerpt from Cooley's Torts states:
In all those employments where peculiar
skill is requisite, if one offers his
services, he is understood as holding
himself out to the public as possessing
the degree of skill commonly possessed by
others in the same employment ... . But
no man, whether skilled or unskilled,
undertakes that the task he assumes shall
be performed successfully, and without
fault or error; he undertakes for good
faith and integrity, but not for
infallibility, and he is liable to his
employer for negligence, bad faith, or
dishonesty, but, not for losses
consequent upon mere errors of judgment.
(3 Cooley, Torts 335 (4th ed. 1932)).
Negligence, on the part of accountants and tax
preparers, requires the same elements as does actions for
negligence

against

attorneys, doctors, architects, and
8

engineers.

Before liability for negligence can be imposed,

the elements of: (1) a duty to

conform to a required

standard of care, (2) a failure or breach of duty to conform
to that

required

standard,

(3) a causal connection or

"proximate cause" between the defendant's conduct and the
plaintiff's damage, and (4) actual loss or damage incurred by
plaintiff, must be found.

(W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law

of Torts § 30 at 143 (4th ed. 1971)).
For Daines not to have his motion for directed
verdict

be granted

by the trial Court, Knight had to

establish the "standard of care" applicable to Daines and
Daines' breach of that standard.
Because these matters are outside the knowledge and
experience of lay persons, expert accountant's/tax preparer's
testimony was required to establish causation, the standard
of tax preparation for partnerships re: termination, the
breach of the standard, and the damages as a consequence
thereof.
In his case in chief, Knight failed to prove that
Daines breached his duty as an accountant for the partnership
in not preparing the partnership tax return reporting (for
purposes

of

the

IRS

Code) that

the

partnership

was

terminated; he also failed to provide evidence to the trial
Court showing that he suffered any actual losses, damages or
other injury from the non-termination of the partnerships.
Assuming arguendo that Daines had a duty to Knight

9

in preparing the tax return for the Partnership as to whether
or not to show a termination of the partnership for tax
purposes, Dairies' duty was that of exercising the skill and
knowledge ordinarily possessed

and exercised

members of the profession of tax preparers
circumstances,
partnership.

in preparing

the

tax

by other
in similar

returns

for the

It was Knight's burden of proof to make by

preponderance of the evidence, a prima facia case, through
expert testimony, that the above referred to duty by Daines
was breached; furthermore, Knight had the burden of proof
that Daines1

acts

(in not reporting termination of the

partnerships) were a proximate cause of Knight's injury, if
any, and lastly, that Daines alleged failure to exercise the
requisite skill caused damages to Knight.
A.

No breach of standard of care.

Knight failed to establish a failure or a breach of
duty to a required standard of care by Daines.

The only

evidence in the record as it relates to both issues of:

a)

the duty owed to Knight by Daines, and b) the breach of such
duty by Daines, comes from the examination of Kevin Heyborne,
the certified

public

accountant who was called by and

testified as an expert on behalf of Knight.
The examination of Knight's expert witness as it
appears upon the transcript, (Index p. 616, Tr. Vol. II, p.
68, line 16 through p. 86, line 15) clearly establishes that
Daines did not breach the duty which he had, that is, to
10

prepare the tax returns for the partnership in any manner
other than as prepared.
Mr. Heyborne in testifying he said that he relied
upon and considered as authoritative sources for purposes of
income tax partnership taxation the following:
a)

Tax Management Portfolio, 1983 Tax Management, Inc.,

237-2d, p. 42 (Index p. 616, Tr. Volume 2, p. 71, lines 9-12,
Addendum, Ex. "B" ).
b)

IRS Regulations § 1.708-1, Research Institute of

America Service, Federal Tax Coordinator 2d, pp. 15,12515,126

(Index p. 616, Tr. Vol. 2, p. 72, lines 16-19,

Addendum, Ex. "C").
c)

Revenue Rulings, 75-423, I. R. B. 1975 - 40,8 (Index

p. 616) Tr. Vol. 2, p. 71, lines 19-21, Addendum, Ex. "D").
d)

CCH Standard Federal Tax Reports, para. 3940.01

(Index p. 616,

Tr. Vol. 2, p. 72, lines 20-22, Addendum,

Ex. "E" ).
All of the foregoing statutes, rules, regulations
and treatises (Addendum, Ex. "B", "C", "D", "E",) applicable
to the issue of termination, clearly
exception

of

§ 708 of the

provide

for the

IRS Code, evidencing

non-

termination of the partnerships; the evidence clearly and
unequivocally support the interpretation by Daines of § 708
of the IRS Code, in NOT providing for the termination of the
partnership
unequivocally

for

tax

purposes; they

also

clearly

and

support the method of preparation of the
11

partnership tax returns in not terminating them.
Mr. Heyborne fully agreed with the foregoing as it
is shown by the record:
Q. Now, sir, does that mean, in essence, if
the partners, both incoming and withdrawing,
desired not to have a termination, the way to
structure the transaction in order to avoid
the consequences of termination -A.

Okay.

Q. -- would be to make it look like it was a
contribution. Isn't that correct?
A. Yes.

Q.
The o t h e r
liquidation?
A. Correct.

alternative

would

be a

Q.
There is no evidence the liquidation of
any of those partnerships took place that you
are aware of?
A.

Not that I am aware of.

Q.
And based on the returns that you have
filed for years subsequent to
1983, and as I
understand you testified, in f84?
A. Yes.
Q.

You prepared them in f84?

A.

That is correct.

Q.

And for '85?

A. Yes.
Q.

And for f86?

A. Yes.
Q.

How about f87?
12

A. Yes.
Q.
Okay.
Four years you did not cause
liquidation, did you?
A.

That is correct.

Q.

And you did not cause a termination?

A.

That is correct.

Q. You did not report in the K-ls or in the
returns a termination?
A.

That is correct.

Q. Thank you. Mr. Heyborne, let me ask you
the following hypothetical: If the intent of
the partners were not to terminate the
partnership for fear of accelerating a
mortgage indebtedness upon the partnership, do
you have an opinion as to how this particular
transaction should have been structured?
A. Let me put that back to you so that I am
sure I understand what you are saying.
Q.

Sure.

A.
In your hypothetical situation you are
saying that you have partners that if the
partnership is liquidated or terminated -Q.

If it's terminated.

A.
-- they will accelerate their
payment. They did not have the cash to
that note payment. Then they would not
to do anything which would jeopardize
position.
Q. That is correct.
you.
A.

note
make
want
that

That's what I am asking

Okay.

Q. Now then, the question i s , do you have an
opinion as to how you should structure that
transaction?
A.
The t r a n s a c t i o n would have t o be
s t r u c t u r e d so as not t o t e r m i n a t e the
13

partnership.
Q.
Which is exactly the same way as is
structured here, not terminate?
A.
If that was the agreement of all the
partners, and if that's how the consensus of
opinion is, yes.
Q.
But that's what you would have advised
your client to do, wouldn't you?
A.

If that's the case, that's correct.

Q. If your client told you, I do not want to
terminate the mortgage with Prudential Federal
Savings, how do I go about doing it; do I have
a termination now or do I avoid the tax
consequences in order to defer them?
Isn't
that what you would advise them to do?
A. Yes.
Q. And you would have structured essentially
the transaction to be done the same way and
the returns not to reflect a termination.
Isn't that what you would have done?
A.

That is correct.

Mr. Heyborne in testifying as an expert in a rather
complicated tax matter, stated in his testimony that in
interpreting section 708 of the Internal Revenue Code, that
he did not do any research although he recognized

the

importance of researching in arriving at a conclusion.

The

colloquy between Mr. Heyborne and counsel for Mr. Daines is
rather instructive on this point; it appears as follows:
Q. Would you agree, Mr. Heyborne, that income
tax provisions, especially relating to
partnerships, are rather complicated items?
A.

Extremely.

Q.
And would you also agree, sir, that it
requires the research in connection with
14

arriving at a particular answer?
A.

Yes.

Q.
In connection with your testimony today,
sir, how much research did you do in arriving
at your opinions today?
A.
On this particular instance, basically
there was no underlying research into the
underlying facts and circumstances of the
case. It was merely stating Section 708.
Q. And you were asked that by Mr. Nebeker to
do that research?
A.

No. Not to do the research.

Q.
Okay, Did you do any research in
connection with your testimony today relating
to your opinion as to the termination of the
partnership under the rules under Section 708?
A.
Basically what I did was, under Rule 708
if, in f a c t , there was a purchase of
partnership interest, there would have been a
termination of the partnership.
I did not
delve any further than that into that
particular question.
Q.
I see.
So you said -- you were told or
you assumed, there has been a purchase of the
partnership under Section 708, is it?
A.

That is correct.

(Index p. 616, Tr. Vol. 2, p. 72, line 25 through p. 74, line
5.)
The standard of preparation of the partnership tax
returns was set forth by Mr. Heyborne, to be exactly the same
way Daines prepared the partnership tax returns.

(Index p.

616, Tr. Vol. 2, p. 83, line 11 through p. 84, line 8;

see

also: Index p. 616, Tr. Vol. 2, p. 86, lines 4-15).
Interestingly

enough when
15

the same Mr. Heyborne

prepared

the

partnership

returns

[at the

request

of Mr.

Knight] for each of the subsequent years, 1984, 1985, 1986,
and 1987, he prepared them in such a way so as NOT to cause a
termination of the partnership.

(Index p. 616, Tr. Vol 2. p„

81, line 21 through p. 82 line 15).
The fact that the partnership return was prepared
in accordance with the interpretation of Mr. Daines of the
provisions

of section 708 of the

IRS Code, including

the

applicable exception as to termination, is further buttressed
by the contents of the transmittal letter of Mr. Daines to
Mr. Knight in sending him the 1983 returns (Index p. 616, Tr.
Vol. 2, page 182, line 20 through page 183 line 17, Addendum
Ex. "F") wherein Daines specifically informed Knight that in
the event of an audit, the IRS may take a different view of
the

return

and

it

may

have occurred.

termination

[IRS] may make

a determination

When Knight

that a

received

the

transmittal letter including the tax returns, Knight did NOT
respond or take any action to indicate to Daines or any other
third

party,

that Knight

disagreed

with

the way the tax

returns were prepared (Index 616, Tr. Vol. 2, p. 185, lines
3-12).
Knight's failure to establish a prima facie case
for negligence was also impliedly acknowledged by Knight's
counsel as evidenced by the following exchange:
THE COURT [to Mr. Nebeker] :
Do you
think that is just a question of law, or
do you think it is a question for the
jury?
16

MR. NEBEKER: I think that I am entitled
to cross-examine their experts as to what
really happened here.
Tr. Vol. 3, p. 123, line 22 through p. 124, line 2; see also:
the exchange between the trial Court and Knight's counsel.
(Index p. 616, Tr. Vol. 3, p. 124, lines 3-25).

It is also

worthy of note the fact that on the issues of malpractice,
Knight's counsel did not examine, either in direct or cross
examination, Daines ... the defendant against whom Knight was
making the allegations of negligence.
The reading

of the Siller Brothers, Inc. vs.

Comm'r, 89 T. C. No. 22 (1987) case, by Knight in his brief
is not applicable to the facts of the case at bar. The Siller
case is a "liquidation" and not a "termination" case; in that
case the tax court decided that the partner was required to
recapture the investment tax credit because it acquired
partnership property

in a liquidating distribution, and

further that the acquiring partner could not continue to use
the partnership property in the same business since no
partnership existed.

Similarly, the 1987 Revenue Rulings,

relied upon by Knight in his brief, are not applicable to the
facts

of

this

sale/exchange

case
of

since

they

partnership

are

dealing

interests

and

with

not

a

with

contribution of capital into the partnerships.
B)

No proof of proximate cause.

The record is devoid of any evidence and Knight in
his brief does not point out any part of the record showing a
17

causal

connection or

"proximate" cause between Dairies'

conduct in not reporting the termination of the partnership
and Knightf s damages.
C)

No proof of damages by Knight.

The

record

is

devoid

of

any

evidence

and

Appellant's brief does not point to any part of the record
wherein it is shown that Knight suffered any actual loss or
damage as a result of Daines' alleged "failure" to report the
termination of the partnership.
Dines respectfully submits that the trial Court
should be sustained in its order granting Daines directed
verdict on the issue of the preparation of the partnership
tax returns for the year 1983.
2.

Daines' fiduciary
duty to Knight as a
partner was not
breached.
If Daines had any fiduciary duty to Knight as a

partner, such duty by necessity must have arisen out of the
partnership agreement, or the statutory obligations imposed
by § 48-1-17, and § 48-1-88, Utah Code Annotated, (Addendum,
Ex. "G") or by

other agreement(s) of the partners, or by

common law.
There is no evidence upon the record that Daines
breached any duty imposed upon Daines by the partnership
agreement.

Similarly, there is no evidence upon the record

that Daines breached any of the statutory duties imposed upon
Daines by virtue of any statutory provision.
18

As it relates to any other potential claimed breach
of

the

fiduciary

duty of Daines to Knight, as a partner

arising out of a verbal agreement, that issue was found in
favor of Daines by the jury, in that the jury, based upon the
evidence

presented,

answered

the special

interrogatory

as

follows:
#5
Did Daines orally agree to pay
the entire $ 65,000.00 given him by
Knight for taxes?
ANSWER:

Yes

No

X

(Index p. 547).
In view of the foregoing and the absence of any
evidence of a breach of Daines1 duty to Knight as a partner
this Court should uphold the ruling and order of the trial
Court.
POINT II
DAINES IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT
AGAINST KNIGHT IN THE AMOUNT
WHICH LEACH RECOVERED AGAINST
DAINES.
Knight argues that "there is no authority to grant
Daines a judgment against Knight merely because Knight agreed
to

assume

the

Leach obligation

(Knight Brief, p. 20).

and hasn't yet

performed"

Knight claims that Daines is not

entitled to a judgment until he actually pays the Note owing
to Leach.

Common sense says this argument is frivolous.

do the cases.

Knight agreed, unconditionally

So

and without

reservation, to assume and pay timely the Leach obligation
(Addendum, Ex. "A", p. 2, para. 7 ) .
Knight

breached

his obligation.
19

The jury has found that
It would

be

absolutely

absurd to deny Daines a remedy for this breach unless and
until Daines actually paid the Note.
There are three kinds of indemnities.
Friedman, 317 A. 2d 831 (Md. 1974).

Levin v.

The first kind, which

Knight has reference to, is "indemnity against loss or
damage".

Under that type of indemnity, the indemnitee cannot

recover until he has made payment or otherwise suffered an
actual loss or damage.

The second kind of indemnity is

"indemnity against liability".

Under this type of indemnity,

the indemnitee is entitled to recover when a judgment is
entered against him regardless of the fact that the judgment
has not yet been paid.

The third type of indemnity contract,

which is involved in the present case, is described in Levin
v. Friedman, supra at 831, 834-835 (Md. 1974) as follows:
There is yet a third type of indemnity
contract, however, one which contains a promise of
the indemnitor to perform a certain act or to make
specified payments for the benefit of the
indemnitee.
Under such a contract, an immediate
right of action accrues to the indemnitee upon the
failure of the indemnitor to perform, regardless of
any actual damage has been sustained.
[citations
omitted]
"[W]here the plaintiff holds not merely an
agreement to indemnity and save harmless against
the consequences of the default of the other, but
an express promise to pay a debt, or to do some
particular act, then the position of the parties
entirely changes.
The relation of principal and
surety disappears, and it has been held that the
failure to perform the act agreed on gives the
plaintiff a right of action even before he has
suffered any direct damage himself; and so it has
also been decided as a rule of pleading."
Accord: 41 Am Jur 2d, Indemnity, Sec. 28.
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Knight's reliance upon Harshaw dba Harshaw Bonding
Company v. Mustafa, 321 N. C. 288, 362 S. E. 2nd 541 (1987)
is totally misplaced; in that case the North Carolina Supreme
Court applying

section 26-3.1(a) of the North Carolina

Statutes, held that a surety on an appearance bond may not
sue his principal until the surety has paid all or part of
the bond.

While the facts of that case are based upon a

theory of surety - principal, the facts of the case at bar
involve the theory of indemnity.

Daines is entitled to

judgment against Knight immediately because Knight breached
his promise to pay the Leach note, and Leach recovered
judgment against Daines.
Knight appears to rely upon the recent case of
Horman v. Gordon, 740 P. 2d 1346, 63 Utah Adv. Rep. 35, Ut.
Ct. App., 1987); however, his reliance is again misplaced.
That case dealt with issues of novation and release and not
with indemnity; the Utah Court of Appeals reversed the trial
on the issue of liability of the maker of the notes (Gordon)
to Horman because the notes were assumed by Kingston and
Kingston

was

discharged

by Horman without

an

express

reservation of rights.
To allow Knight to prevail upon his theory of
"indemnity against loss or damage" under the facts of this
case, would create and necessitate the filing of multiple
actions by Daines against Knight so that Daines can recover
from Knight for each portion of the judgment amount which
21

Daines pays to Leach, or for such an amount as Leach may
successfully

obtain

from

Daines

executions,

garnishments,

from

etc..

successive

Judicial

multiple

economy

also

dictates against acceptance of Knight's theory.
Daines respectfully submits that this Court should
affirm the judgment of the trial Court in awarding Daines
judgment

against

Knight

for

the

amount

of

the

judgment

recovered by Leach against Daines.
CONCLUSION
Daines respectfully

submits that the trial

Court

was correct in granting his motion for a directed verdict;
further,

the

trial

Court

was

correct

in awarding

Daines

judgment against Knight in the amount equal to the amount of
judgment obtained by Leach against Daines.
This Court

should enter

its order

affirming

the

judgment of the trial Court.
Additionally, Daines should be awarded

its costs

and attorney's fees in connection with this appeal, and for
such other relief as this Court deems proper in the premises.
DATED this ^ 4

day of January, 1989.

NICK
Attorney \£p6: Welden L. Daines
Defendant-Respondent
466 South 400 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3303
Tele: (801) 521-4441
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ADDENDUM

EXHIBIT

f

A!

MEfDRANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
THIS MEMORANDUM of U n d e r s t a n d i n g i s made ar d entered i r it o
t h i s 15th 3--> i f November, 1 9 8 3 , by and between KENNET- K. KNIGHT,
t - i e 1 t • > a s KNI Gi i*I ai 4 WEI E EN L. DA

e: f. a::
reftrrei
(L,

her eirpft^r

to as DAINES in his capacity as; (a) General Partner of

;

. *;

Mansgirg General Part' er of RSL; (c) President of Western Planning

Co-pary, General Partner of 1't. George Travel Center ( L a n d l o r d ) ;

(d)

President of Mountain States Hospitality, Inc. and President of Nelson,
D a i r e s & A s s o c i a t e s and (e) i n d i v i d u a l l y , hereinafatei
referred

to as DAINES and SHELDON G. PLAYER and

hereinafter reSerrei

collectively
"-. WILLYARD

to as FLAYER AND WILLYARD.

WITNESSETH:
In consideration of the Assignment of Partnership i n t e r e s t of
ever, date herewith the p a r t i e s hereto agree as follows:
1.
:CLLAr;3

KNIGHT w i l l p a y t o DAINES t h e sum o f THIR / THOUS^D

($30,0?0.0J)

toward t h e repayment o f l o a n s .

2. KNIG:!T assumes t h e p r o m i s s o r y n o t e t o G r a r a t o

Importing

Company and p a y s t h e sum o f TWENTY THOUSAND DOLLARS ( $ 2 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ) ard
t h e b a l a n c e o f THIRTY THOUSAND DOLLARS ( $ 3 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ) p l u s i n t e r e s t t o be
p a i d or. or b e f o r e Mar c! i 3 1 , 1 9SM.
3. KNIGHT assumes a l l o b l i g a t i o r s ard r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of
RSLA including all accounts :,:-.'=•'.->, mortga.y

fy

'

-- '• • '• ' - ' c .

'4, RSL A r e t a i n s a l l cash on hand =* ; <-..: account, i e . e i v a b l e .
5 . S t . G e o r g. e Ti av e 1 Cen t e r ': =-.: d l c ^ d ^ co~;* om 1 s e s
s e t t l e MS it ie ac ::r \ < "•:! ] ai d rer i: fay at l e b> R 3! A as of ft %
/ embei
KNIGHT w i l l assume and pay t i m e l y a l l f u t u r e l a r d rer i t s .

15, 19M, )

6 . DAINES a s s i g r s and t r a n s f e r s to KNIGHT t h e e x i s t i n g
management c o n t r a c t for t h e Rock Springs Hilton Inn, i n c l u d i n g a l l
accounts receivable from RSLA.
7. KNIGHT w i l l assume and pay timely the "Leach" obligation
(of approximately $167,000.00) ard shall pay the o b l i g a t i o n t o .PLAYER
AND WILLYARD (of a p p r o x i m a t e l y $366,000.00) in accordance with the
provisions of the Supplemental Agreement.
8. DAINES will deliver timely to KNIGHT a l l books and records
of RSLA now in the possession of DAINES.
9. This Memorandum of Understanding s h a l l be deemed for

all

purposes a b i n d i n g ard enforceable cor t r a c t . I t i s recognized by each
of t h e p a r t i e s h e r e t o , however, t h a t a f u r t h e r Memorandum may be
required

t o more p a r t i c u l a r l y s e t f o r t h c e r t a i n a s p e c t s of t h e

agreement and to that extent each party hereto agrees t o execute such
f u e r t h e r documents as s h a l l be reasonably required in the opinion of
t h e i r respective counsels.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the p a r t i e s executed t h i s agreement in the
date f i r s t above w r i t t e n .

//

/

KE?JI;ETH K. KNIGHT

///
~T~

VELDEN L. DAINES, individually and in
his capacity as:
Kanagirg Partner of RSL,
General Partner of RSLA
President of Western Planning Company,
as General Partner of St. George Travel
Center
President of Mountain States Hospitality
Inc. and

President of Nelson, Haines 4 Associates

J.R WILLYAflD
General Partner
SHELDON" G. PUYER
General Partner

a

EXHIBIT

'B'

Sales of partnership interests to other partners in the
e partnership can trigger a partnership termination,
fever, the regulations statethat neither the liquidation
T^artncrsftipi^ragtTIP^
property to
pttrtucishlp iri "exchange for a partnership interest is a
or exchaftgrffrTKmare of I7TO(b)(iKBJ.«' In Rey.
, 75-42JT'^tlRr Service ruled mat a contnouhon of
i to a partnership by new partners in exchange for more
i 50 percent of the capital and profits interest in the
nership does not terminate the partnership, since the
fige in ownership is not the result of a "sale or cadge." This suggests that the partners can avoid terminaupon the admission of new partners or the withdrawal
artners by structuring the transaction as a contributioxp—iquidation. However, as discussed in II C 4 above, the
ity of the partners to avoid sale or exchange treatment
contribution of cash to the partnership followed by a
ribution of the cash to the withdrawing partner may be
ted by the step-transaction doctrine.403
Section 708(b)(1)(B) applies to all non-taxable cxnges of partnership interests. Thus, for example, in
g v. Comr.,** the Tax Court held that a like-kind
hange of two 25 percent interests terminated a partner). Moreover, the Service has rules that the transfer of a
c than 50 percent partnership interest to a Whollytcd corporation*01 or to another partnership*" termiss the partnership under 1708(b)(1)(B).401 However, as
:d in II, A, 2, above, the Service has rules that the
version of a genera! partnership interest to a limited
tnership interest in the same partnership is not a taxable
nt and does not terminate the partnership.
Effect of Termination of Partnership Under
3708(b)(1)(A)
If the partnership terminates under §708(b)(l)(A),
ause one partner acquires the interest of all the other
tners or the partnership ceases to carry on a business,
ncial operation or venture, the taxable year of the
tncrship closes with respect to all the partners.410 The
:ct can be to "bunch" the income of some or all of the
tners, if such partners have taxable years that vary from
t of the partnership.
Example: Assume that Partnership AB has a fiscal
year ending January 31 and that its partners have a
calendar taxable year. If AB terminates on November
30, 1982, A and B are required to report in their
returns for 1982 their distributable share of the partnership taxable income for the year ended January 31,
1981, plus their share of the partnership income for the
short period ended November 30, 1982.

' Rep |i.7(*-i(b)(U).
•1975-2 C I . 260.
'Regs. |1.70S~l(b)(l)(u) eoouint in eipresa reference to
731-1 (c)(3), which mentions the step transaction doctrine as a potengrouad for challenging a cofitributioVdistribuuon.
•77 T.C. 1045(1981).
" Rev. Rftl. 11-31, 1911-1 C.& 14. See Evans v. Comr. 54 T.C. 40
70), afd. 447 F.2d 547 (7th Or. 1971) (Transfer of 50 percent
Teat to wholly-owned corporation terminated partnership).
» P J J L II16041 (January 21, 1911).
* Other exchange! are considered ia IV, above.
• |706<c)(l); Rega. |l.70S-l(b)(I)(iii).
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Effect of Termination Under l70i(b)(l)(B)
1. Deemed Distribution-Recontribution

If the partnership is terminated under |708(b)(l)(B)v
the partnership is treated as having made a pro rata
liquidating distribution of all its assets to the purchaser and
remaining partners who, in turn, are treated as having
recontributed the property to a new partnership, either for
the continuation of the business or for its winding up and
dissolution.4" All of the consequences of the termination
flow from this deemed distribution-recontribution of the
partnership assets.412 Some of the more significant consequences include the following:
2. Recognition of Gain
Under §731(a), no gain is recognized on a distribution
for a partnership unless the amount of cash received exceeds the adjusted basis of the partnership interest. Thus,
when a partnership terminates under §708(b)(l)(B), a
partner could be required to recognize gain on the deemed
distribution of the partnership's assets, if the partner's
share of the cash held by the partnership exceeds the
adjusted basis of his partnership interest. A partner could
also be required to recognize gain if the partner's assumption of partnership liabilities on the deemed distribution is
less than the partner's share of partnership liabilities under
Regs. §1.752-1(e), and such excess is greater than the
adjusted basis of the partner's interest.
Under §721, no gain is recognized upon a contribution
of property to a partnership in exchange for a partnership
interest. Thus, the deemed recontribution of assets to the
new partnership under §708 does not result in the recognition of gain.
J. Effect on Basis of Partnership Assets
The termination may have an effect on the basis of the
assets of the new partnership, even if the partners arc not
required to recognize gain. Each partner's basis for his
share of the partnership properties deemed distributed to
him upon a termination under §708(b)(l)(B) is the adjusted basis of his partnership interest at the time of the
distribution, less any money deemed distributed to the
partner.413 Thus, if a partner is required to recognize gain
on the deemed distribution because the amount of cash
deemed distributed exceeds the adjusted basis of his partnership interest, the remaining assets deemed distributed to
such partner will have a zero basis in his hands. On the
other hand, if the adjusted basis of the partner's partnership interest exceeds the amount of cash and the adjusted
basis of the assets deemed distributed (because the partner
purchased the interest for a price which exceeded his share
of the adjusted basis of partnership assets), then the basis
of the assets will be stepped up in the hands of the partner.
The partner's basis in his partnership interest is allocated
among the assets in accordance with §732(c), which provides that the basis (minus any money received) is allocated

411

Rega. |1.70l-l(b)(l)(iv).

.

m

See generally. Birkeland and Postlewatte, T h e Uncertain Tax Ramiftcation* of a Terminating Deposition of s Partnership Interest - - T h e
Constructive Termination of a Partnership," 30 Tax Lawyer 335 (1976).
"» |732(b).

O 1983 Tax Management Inc., a aubekftary of The Bureau of National
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EXHIBIT

'C

\-ggL
Partners and Partnerships

Regs.|L708-l

made to a person who is not a member of the partnership,
and the rules of section 263 (relating to capita) expenditures) must be taken into account. This rule does not affect
the deductibility to the partnership of a payment described
in section 73b(aX2) 10 a retiring partner or to a deceased
partner's successor in interest Guaranteed pavments do not
constitute an interest in partnership profits for purposes of
sections 706(b)(3), 707(b). and 70Sfb) For the purposes of
other provisions of the internal revenue laws, guaranteed
payments are regarded as a partner's distributive share of
ordinary income. Thus, a partner who receives guaranieed
payments for a penod during which he is absent from work
because of persona] injuries or sickness is not entitled to
exclude such payments from his gross income under section
105(d). Similarly, a partner who receives guaranteed payments is not regarded as an employee of the partnership for
the purposes of withholding of tax at source, deferred
compensation plans, etc The provisions of this paragraph
may be illustrated by the following examples:
ExMmpIc (}). Under the ABC partnership agreement,
partner A is entitled to a fixed annual payment of $10,000
for services, without regard to the income of the partnership. His distributive share is 10 percent After deducting
the guaranteed payment, the partnership has $50,000 ordinary income. A must include $15,000 as ordinary income
for his taxable year within or with which the partnership
taxable year ends ($10,000 guaranteed payment plus $5,000
distributive share).
Example (2) Partner C in the CD partnership is to
receive 30 percent of partnership income as determined
before taking into account any guaranteed pavments, but
not less than $10,000. The income of the partnership is
$60,000, and C is entitled to $18,000 (30 percent of
$60,000) as his distributive share. No part of this amount is
a guaranteed payment. However, if the partnership had
income of $20,000 instead of $60,000, $6,000 (30 percent of
$20,000) would be partner C's distributive share, and the
remaining $4,000 pavable to C would be a guaranteed
payment
Example (3) Partner X in the XY partnership is to
receive a pavment of S 10.000 for services, plus 30 percent
of the taxable income or loss of the partnership After
deducting the payment of $10,000 to partner X. the XY
partnership has a loss of $9,000. Of this amount, $2,700
(30 percent of the loss) is X's distributive share of partnership loss and, subject to section 704(d), is to be taken into
account by him in his return. In addition, he must report
as ordinary income the guaranteed payment of $10,000
made to him by the partnership.
Example (4). Assume the same facts as in example (3) of
this paragraph, except that, instead of a $9,000 loss, the
partnership has $30,000 in capital gains and no other items
of income or deduction except the $10,000 paid X as a
guaranteed payment. Since the items of partnership income
or loss must be segregated under section 702(a), the partnership has a $10,000 ordinary loss and $30,000 in capital
gains. X's 30 percent distributive shares of these amounts
are $3,000 ordinary loss and $9,000 capital gain. In addition, X has received a $10,000 guaranteed payment which
is ordinary income to him.
T.D ai7S. S/23/34.
VSJ.

T.D i3«2. */»0/SI. T D 7WI. $/

11.70S-1 Continuation of partnership,
(a) General rule. For purposes of subchapter K, chapter
FEDERAL TAX COORDINATOR 2d

ft/*'aM2a

1 of the Code, an existing partnership shall be considered
as continuing if it is not terminated.
(b) Termination—(J) General rule, (i) A partnership
shall terminate when the operations of the partnership arc
discontinued and no part of an> business, financial operation, or venture of the partnership continues to be carried
on by 3n> of its partners in a partnership For example, on
November 20, 1956, A and B, each of whom is a 20percent partner in partnership ABC, sell their interests to
C, who is a 60-percent partner Since the business is no
longer carried on by any of its partners in a partnership,
the ABC partnership is terminated as of November 20,
1956. However, where partners DEF agree on Apnl 30,
1957, to dissolve their partnership, but carry on the business through a winding up penod ending September 30,
1957, when all remaining assets, consisting only of cash,
are distributed to the partners, the partnership does not
terminate because of cessation of business until September
30, 1957.
(a) Upon the death of one partner in a 2-member
partnership, the partnership shall not be considered as
terminated if the estate or other successor in interest of the
deceased partner continues to share in the profits or losses
of the partnership business.
(b) For the continuation of a partnership where payments are being made under section 736 (relating to payments to a retiring partner or a deceased partner's successor in interest, see paragraph (a)(6) of § 1.736-1.
(ii) A partnership shall terminate when 50 percent or
more of the total interest in partnership capital and profits
is sold or exchanged within a penod of 12 consecutive
months. Such sale or exchange includes a sale or exchange
to another member of the partnership. However, a disposition of a partnership interest by gift (including assignment
to a successor in interest), bequest, or inheritance, or the
liquidation of a partnership interest, is not a sale or
exchange for purposes of this subparagraph. Furthermore,
the contribution of property to a partnership does not
constitute such a sale or exchange See, however, paragraph
(c)(3) of § 1 731-1. Fifty percent or more of the total
interest in partnership capital and profits means 50 percent
or more of the total interest in partnership capital plus 50
percent or more of the total interest in partnership profits.
Thus, the sale of a 3v'-percent interest in partnership capital
and a 60-percent interest in partnership profits is not the
sale or exchange of 50 percent or more of the total interest
in partnership capital and profits. If one or more partners
sell or exchange interests aggregating 50 percent or more of
the total interest in partnership capita) and 50 percent or
more of the total interest in partnership profits within a
period of 12 consecutive months, such sale or exchange is
considered as being within the provisions of this subparagraph. When interests are sold or exchanged on different
dates, the percentages to be added are determined as of the
date of each sale. For example, with respect to the ABC
partnership, the sale by A on May 12, 1956, of a 30percent interest in capital and profits to D, and the sale by
B on March 27, 1957, of a 30-percent interest in capital
and profits to E, is a sale of 50-percent or more interest
Accordingly, the partnership is terminated as of March 27,
1957. However, if. on March 27. 1957, D instead of & sold
his 30-percent interest in capital and profits to E, there
would be no termination since only one 30-percent interest
would have been sold or exchanged within a 12-month
period.
(iii) For purposes of subchapter H, chapter I of the
Code, a partnership taxable year closes with respect to all
partners on the date on which the partnership terminates.

15,125

Regs. § 1.708-1
See section 706(cXl) and paragraph (cXI) of § 1 706-1 The
date of termination is
(a) For purposes of section 708(bKIMA), the date on
which the winding up of the partnership affairs is completed.
(b) For purposes of section 708(b)(1)(B). the date of the
sale or exchange of a partnership interest which, of itself or
together with sales or exchanges in the preceding 12
months, transfers an interest of 50 percent or more in both
partnership capital and profits.
(iv) If a partnership is terminated by a sale or exchange
of an interest, the following is deemed to occur: The
partnership distributes its properties to the purchaser and
the other remaining partners in proportion to their respective interests in the partnership properties, and, immediately thereafter, the purchaser and the other remaining
partners contribute the properties to a new partnership,
either for the continuation of the business or for its dissolution and winding up. In the latter case, the new partnership
terminates in accordance with subdivision (i) of this subparagraph. Set sections 731 and 732 and §§ 1.731-1 and
1.732-1. For election of basis adjustments by the purchaser
and other remaining partners, see sections 732(d) and
743(b) and paragraph (d) of § 1.732-1 and paragraph (b) of
$ 1.743-1.
(2) Special rules—(i) Merger or consolidation. If two or
more partnerships merge or consolidate into one partnership, the resulting partnership shall be considered a continuation of the merging or consolidating partnership the
members of which own an interest of more than 50 percent
in the capital and profits of the resulting partnership If the
resulting partnership can. under the preceding sentence, be
considered a continuation of more than one of the mcrgering or consolidating partnerships, it shall, unless the Commissioner permits otherwise, be considered the continuation
of that partnership which is credited with the contribution
of the greatest dollar value of assets to the resulting
partnership Any other merging or consolidating partnerships shall be considered as terminated If the members of
none of the merging or consolidating partnerships have an
interest of more than 50 percent in the capital and profits
of the resulting partnership, all of the merged or consolidated partnerships are terminated, and a new partnership
results. The taxable years of such merging or consolidating
partnerships which are considered terminated shall be
closed in accordance with the provisions of section 706(c),
and such partnerships shall file their returns for a taxable
year ending upon the date of termination, i.e., the date of
merger or consolidation. The resulting partnership shall file
a return for the taxable year of the merging or consolidating partnership that is considered as continuing The return
shall state that the resulting partnership is a continuation
of such merging or consolidating partnership and shall
include the names and addresses of the merged or consolidated partnerships. The respective distributive shares of the
partners for the periods prior to and subsequent to the date
of merger or consolidation shall be shown is a part of the
return. The provisions of this subdivision may be illustrated
by the following example:
Example Partnership AB, in whose capital and profits A
and B each own a 50-percent interest, and partnership CD,
in whose capital and profits C and D each own a 50percent interest, merge on September 30, 1955, and form
partnership ABCD Partners A, B, C. and D are on a
calendar year, partnership AB is also on a calendar year,
and partnership CD is on a fiscal year ending June 30th.
After the merger, the partners have capital and profits
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interests as follows: A. 30 percent; B. 30 percent; C, 20
percent; and D, 20 percent. Since A and B together own an
interest of more than 50 percent in the capital and profits
of partnership ABCD, such partnership shall be considered
a continuation of partnership AB and shall continue to file
returns on a calendar year basis Since C and D own an
interest of less than 50 percent in the capital and profits of
partnership ABCD, the taxable year of partnership CD
closes as of September 30, 1955, the date of the merger,
and CD partnership is terminated as of that date Partnership ABCD is required to file a return for the taxable year
January 1 to December 31, 1955, indicating thereon that,
until September 30, 1955, it was partnership AB Partnership CD is required to file a return for its final taxable
year. July 1 through September 30, 1955.
(ti) Division of a partnership Upon the division of a
partnership into two or more partnerships, any resulting
partnership or partnerships shall be considered a continuation of the prior partnership if its members had an interest
of more than 50 percent in the capital and profits of the
prior partnership. Any other resulting partnership will not
be considered a continuation of the prior partnership but
will be considered a new partnership. If the members of
none of the resulting partnerships owned an interest of
more than 50 percent in the capital and profits of the
divided partnership, the divided partnership is terminated.
Where members of a partnership which has been divided
into two or more partnerships do not become members of a
resulting partnership which is considered a continuation of
the pnor partnership, such partner's interests shall be
considered liquidated as of the date of the division. The
resulting partnership that is regarded as continuing shall
file a return for the taxable year of the partnership that has
been divided The return shall state that the partnership is
a continuation of the divided partnership and shall set forth
separately the respective distributive shares of the partners
for the periods prior to and subsequent to the date of
division. The provisions of this subdivision may be illustrated by the following example.
Example Partnership ABCD is in the real estate and
insurance business. A owns a 40-percent interest, and B, C,
and D each owns a 20-pcrcent interest, in the capital and
profits of the partnership The partnership and the partners
report their income on a calendar year They agree to
separate the real estate and insurance business as of November 1, 1955, and to form two partnerships, partnership
AB to take over the real estate business, and partnership
CD to take over the insurance business Since members of
resulting partnership AB owned more than a 50-percent
interest in the capital and profits of partnership ABCD (A,
40 percent, and B, 20 percent), partnership AB shall be
considered a continuation of partnership ABCD. Partnership AB is required to file a return for the taxable year
January 1 to December 31, 1955, indicating thereon that
until November 1, 1955, it was partnership ABCD. In
forming partnership CD, partners C and D may contribute
the property distributed to them in liquidation of their
entire interests in divided partnership ABCD. Partnership
CD will be required to file a return for the taxable year it
adopts pursuant to section 706(b) and paragraph (b) of
{ 1.706-1.
T O . 4173. S/2VJA,

{ 1.709-1 Treatment of orgaaixatioa and lysdicatk* coat*.
(a) General rule. Except as provided in paragraph (b) of
this section, no deduction shall be allowed under chapter 1
s/x/u-its
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1969, provided, as one of the alternative
methods available to mutual savings banks in
computing the reserve for bad debts on
qualifying real property loans, a method
designated as the "percentage of real property loans method." Under this method the
larger the qualifvmg real propert) loan ba^e,
the larger the allowable addition to the
bad debt reserve. (As amended by the
Tax Reform Act of 1969, section 593(b)(3)
now provides that mutual savmps banks
may compute their reasonable addition to the
reserve for bad debts on qualifying real
property loans by the use of the percentage
method authorized under section 58S(b)(2),
reduced by the amount of the addition to
the reserve for loans on nonqualifying loans
under section 593(b)(1)(A).)
Specifically, the question presented is
whether the warehoused mortgages are includible in the taxpayer's qualifying real
property loan base. To answer this question
it is necessary to determine whether the
transaction entered into between the taxpayer and Z is in fact a sale or merely a
loan in which the mortgages are utilized as
security for repayment of the loan.
~Xs stated above, the taxpa\er under its
agreement with Z is not obligated to purchase from Z any FH\ or VA mortgage that is in default. However, the risk

7 1,82 1

of loss is negligible because all mortgages
are FHA insured or VA guaranteed. The
real risk of loss from these insured or
guaranteed mortgages arises upon the resale
at pnees lower than the original purchase
price. Since under the agreement, the taxpayer and the other savings banks are liable
for losses sustained by Z in selling the
mortgages to other parties, the risk of loss
under the facts in the case remains with
the taxpayer and the other savings banks
Thus Z is insulated from loss on fluctuations
of F H A and VA mortgage values. See
American National Bank of Austin v United
States, [70-1 USTC f 9184] 421 F. 2d 442

(5th

G r 1970), involving the question of whether
a transaction was a sale and repurchase or
a loan, where it was held that a national
bank w^s not the owner of municipal bonds
and thus could not treat the interest collected by it as its own interest because only
persons having the rights and incurring the
risks of ownership may treat the interest
as their own.
Accordingly, since the taxpaver in substance is the owner of the "warehoused
mortgages/* the mortgages are includible
in the qualifying real property loan base of
the taxpaver for the purpose of computing
the addition to the reserve for bad debts
under section 593(b)(3) of the Code.

[B 6905] Rev. Rul. 75-423,1 R. B. 1975-40, 8.
[Code Sec. 708]
Partners and partnerships: Termination: Changes in interest.—Payments of cash by
new partners as contributions to the partnership in exchange for more than 50 percent of the
capital and profits interests in the partnership do not result in a termination of the partnership under the provisions of section 708(b)(1) of the Code. Back reference: fi 3440.30.
Advice has been requested whether the
transaction described below resulted in a
termination of the partnership for Federal
income tax purposes.
An existing partnership offered interests in
the partnership to incoming members for
cash paymerts to the partnership that became part of the capital of the partnership
After the transactions were completed, the
original partners, who had owned 100 percent of the capital and profits interests
in the partnership, then owned only 40 percent of the capital and profits interests in the
partnership.
Section 708(a) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 provides that for purposes
of subchapter K (partners and partnerships)
of the Code, an existing partnership shall
be considered as continuing if it is not terminated.
Section 708(b)(1) of the Code provides,
in part, that a partnership shall be considered as terminated only xf no partof any
'759 CCH—Standard Federal Tax Reports

business, financial operation, or venture of
the partnership continues to be carried on
by any of its partners in a partnership, or,
within a 12-month period there is a sale
or exchange of 50 percent or more of the
total interest in partnership capital and
profits.
Under section 1.708-l(b)(l)(ii) of the Income Tax Regulations, the contribution of
property, including cash, to a partnership is
not a sale or exchange that could cause
its termination. t
Accordingly, in the instant case, the payments of cash by the new partners as contributions to the partnership in exchange for
more than 50 percent of the capital and
profits interests in the partnership did not
result in a termination of the partnership
under the provisions of section 708(b)(1)
of the Code because the change in ownership was not the result of a sale or exchange of partnership interests by or
between members of the partnership.
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CONTINUATION OF PARTNERSHIP— § 708 [% 3938]
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be required to file a return for the taxable year it adopts pursuant to section 706(b) and
§ 1706-Kb). [Reg §1.708-1.]
.10 Historical Comment: Proposed 8/12/55 Adopted 5/23/56 by T.D 6175.
[H 3940]

Termination of Partnership

• • CCH Explanation
.01 What is a termination? As a general rule, a partnership will not
terminate after the death or retirement ui a partner or the taking m of a new
partner. However, a partnership will terminate for federal income tax purports in the following situations il» its operation* are discontinued and no
purl of any business, financial ojK-ration, or venture of the partnership
continue* to be carried on by any of its partners in a partnership form (Code
Sec. 708ib)(l)(A>. Reg. § 1.708-l*<b>< 1 HI)), or (2) there is a sale or exchange of
50% or more in partnership capital and profits within a 12-month period
(Code Sec. 708(b)(1)(B), Reg. § 1.708-l<b)< 1 KiiV). A disposition of a partnership) interest by (a) gift (including assignment to a successor interest), (bi
bequest or inheritance, (c> liquidation of a partnership, afnd (d) the contribution of property to a partnership are not treated as "sales or exchanges"
under this 50%-or-more rule. Therefore, the partnership will not terminate in
buch cases unless the partnership discontinues its operations in a partnership
form. The above rules are amplified below.

I

I
j
j
j

j

I

With one exception, a partnership does not terminate as long as any
part of its business, financial operation, or venture is continued by any of its
partners in a partnership. (Code Sec. 708(b).) And as long as a partner is
receiving any payments from the partnership in liquidation,jH'j_sj£garded as
a partner. Therefore, the retirement of one member of a three-man partnership has no effect on its continuance or on the taxable year of the partnership.
The complete retirement of one member of a two-member partnership terminates the partnership when it ceases to conduct any business as a partnership. The same applies where two member* of a three-member partnership
sell out to the third member.

|

Even if there were only two partners and one of them dies, the
partnership is not considered as terminated if the estate or other successor in
interest of the deceased partner continue* to share in the profits or losses of
J
the partnership busine<* «Reg. § 1.708-1 <b>< 1 "HiMa)'). This i* true wen while
thi- partnership business i* beinc liquidated, as long as the payments :u the
|
t-taU or >u< cevsor l- interest are r«».^HL: mad* «Rea $ 1.7.V> l<a ><6>> In sho:i.
j
a- !<•!.!! as ih(' deeia*iJ partner's »,..•«•**«,:* ,r. inttre>i (or ret;rir.J p a ' t n c - '
j
ui't ivieivmg pavmu.ts ir«»:r. the par:n». r-h.p they an regarded a- piuiurs.
j
The exception mentioned above is where within any 12-month period
there is a sale or exchange of 50% or more of the total interest in partnership
capital and profits. After buch an event, the continuing business is regarded
as a new partnership.
Under the 1954 Code, therefore, neither State law nor the partnership
agreement terminates a partnership. Only cessation of the business or a sale
or exchange of a 507c or more interest can terminate it.
Even though the sale of a 50% interest in the partnership is made
to the remaining partners, the partnership is still terminated (Reg.
§ 1 7081<b>(l >(ii>). The regulations also state that "liquidation of a partnership interest" is not a sale or exchange for this purpose. However, in contrast,
a business may cease operation as a partnership after the disposition of an
interest or interest by gift, as where two partners, each owning a 20%
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Reg. § 1.708-1

|

|

U 3940.01

EXHIBIT

'F'

CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS

DAINES and ASSOCIATES
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TELEPHONE ( « 0 D 3 6 0 ^ 4 0 0

October 2, 1984

MEMDfRS M€WCAN N5TTTUTE
Of O A I F C D PU0UC ACCOUNTANTS

EXPRESS MAIL

Mr. Kenneth K. Knight
11529 North 99th Street
Scottsdale, Arizona 85320
Re:

Tax Returns

Rock Springs Limited 1065 - 1983
Rock Springs Lodging Associates 1065 - 1983

Dear Ken:
Enclosed are the tax returns for the above partnerships.
I have signed as preparer. You should sign as general
partner and mail in envelopes provided. Also, each
return has a copy for you. In addition, your K-l's are
enclosed.
As I mentioned on the phone there is a chance, if they are
audited, that the IRS may hold a termination of the
partnership. The Rock Springs Associates return required
no allocation since the partners remained the same, not so
with Rock Springs Limited as you were allocated 98.611% of
the loss for the last month and a half (12.60% of $404,001.88)
and the same for investment interest (12.60% of $22,165.84).
These returns must be filed by October 15, 1984.
Very truly,yours,

A

/-TUrf

lvelden L. Daines
Enclosures

I
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GENERAL PARTNERSHIP
In absence of agreement or proof of agreement to contrary, partners will divide profits
and losses equally. Kimball v. McCornick
(1927) 70 U 189, 259 P 313.
Collateral References.
Partnership £=» 70.
68 CJS Partnership 176.
60 AmJur 2d 35 to 42, Partnership f{106
to 115.
Accountability of partners for profits
earned subsequent to death or dissolution, 80
ALR 12, 55 ALR 2d 1391.
Actions at law between partners and partnerships, 58 ALR 621,168 ALR 1088.
Construction and application of section 18
(f) of Uniform Partnership Act as to surviving partner's right to compensation for services in winding up partnership, 81 ALR 2d
445.
Duty of former partner, acquiring property
occupied by partnership business, to renew
lease, 40 ALR 2d 102.
Duty of one who joins with others as partners or members of a joint adventure in the
purchase of property from a third person to
share with them the benefit of an existing

48-1-18

option or executory contract for the property,
152 ALR 1001.
Liability of partner for failure to perform
personal services, 165 ALR 981.
Meaning and coverage of "book value" in
partnership agreement in determining value
of partner's interest, 47 ALR 2d 1425.
Partner's breach of fiduciary duty to
copartner on sale of partnership interest to
another partner, 4 ALR 4th 1122.
Powers, duties, and accounting responsibilities of managing partner of mining partnership, 24 ALR 2d 1359.
Provision of partnership agreement giving
one partner option to buy out the other, 160
ALR 523.
Relative rights of surviving partner and
the estate of the deceased partner in proceeds of life insurance acquired pursuant to
partnership agreement, 83 ALR 2d 1347.
Right of partner or member of joint adventure to share in misappropriated money or
property, or secret profits for which he is
required to account, 118 ALR 640.
Right of partners inter se in respect of
interest, 66 ALR 3.
Salaries of partners, contract as to, 66
ALR 2d 1023.

48-1-16. Partnership books. The partnership books shall be kept, subject to any agreement between the partners, at the principal place of business of the partnership, and every partner shall at all times have access
to and may inspect and copy any of them.
History. L. 1921, ch. 89, § 19; RS. 1933 &
C. 1943, 69-1-16.

Collateral Reference*.
Partnership €=> 80.
68 CJS Partnership § 91.
60 AmJur 2d 167, Partnershipft264.

48-1-17. Duty of partners to render information. Partners shall
render on demand true and full information of all things affecting the
partnership to any partner, or the legal representatives of any deceased
partner, or partner under legal disability.
60 AmJur 2d 85, 47, Partnership i{108,
History. L. 1921, ch. 89, § 20; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 69-1-17.
123.
Collateral References.
Partner's breach of fiduciary duty to
copartner on sale of partnership interest to
Partnership «=» 70.
another partner, 4 ALR 4th 1122.
68 CJS Partnership J 76.

48-1-18. Partner accountable as a fiduciary. Every partner must
account to the partnership for any benefit, and hold as trustee for it any
profits, derived by him without the consent of the other partners from any
transaction connected with the formation, conduct or liquidation of the
partnership or from any use by him of its property.
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